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Abstract
To provide personalized services and remain
competitive, many online companies depend on
individual disclosure of personal information. An
emerging common theme, in the quest for privacy
solutions, is the idea to empower individuals to control
the management of their personal information. This
study proposes a third-option design that seeks to
empower users when signing up for an online service.
We also measure individual privacy empowerment in
a 2*2 experimental design study (reward/utility-limit
mechanism to high/low sensitivity information
context) using the proposed third-option design.
Results from the multigroup analysis indicate that
respondents prefer a reward mechanism over a utilitylimit mechanism when asked to disclose less sensitive
data. However, the utility-limit mechanism is
preferred in the highly sensitive group indicating that
a simple linear relationship does not exist between
monetary rewards and information sensitivity.
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

1. Introduction
Touted as the currency of the information
economy, data has become an increasingly valuable
commodity in the big data era. To provide
personalized services and remain competitive, many
online companies depend on the individual disclosure
of personal information. Companies often rely on selfdisclosure mechanisms like site registrations and optin forms to collect demographic and other types of
personal data. However, self-disclosure is a misnomer
as a lot of companies have developed sophisticated
monitoring systems and data mining tools to discreetly
gather personal information without individual
consent. Companies have been found to use
clickstream tools, cookies and tracking software to
unobtrusively collect individual private data. This
apparent lack of transparency behind data collection
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and mining practices constitutes an abuse of individual
privacy rights.
Since the dawn of the Internet, information
privacy has progressively become an important issue
to individuals, companies, policy advocates and
government regulatory bodies. The primary objective
of privacy researchers and regulatory bodies is to
develop the perfect blend of privacy tools and legal
frameworks to concurrently protect individual privacy
rights and facilitate data collection. Over the years,
several privacy tools have been developed and
implemented to help protect online consumer privacy.
One of such tools is the privacy seal program which
has been developed to help consumers identify
websites that follow a basic set of privacy rules.
Similar tools, TRUSTe and P3P, also provide seals to
websites that follow strict privacy policies set by the
Online Privacy Alliance (OPA). These tools provide
assurances to customers that websites with seals abide
by codes of online information practices and promote
fair information collection. However, their impact in
curbing online data abuse have been abysmal due to
their lack of uniformity. Also, it has not been
practically feasible for these seal programs to monitor
all the websites on the internet and as such, consumers
who choose to use only seal approved websites will be
limited to a much restricted number of websites to
access.
Over the years, researchers and privacy advocates
have continued the debate and search for practical yet
effective solutions to information privacy rights abuse.
An emerging common theme, in the quest for privacy
solutions, is the idea to empower individuals to control
the management of their personal information.
Consumer empowerment is attained by providing
customers the privacy control options and rights to
control the nature and content of data collected about
them. Recent studies have defined and operationalized
individual privacy empowerment [1-2]. These studies
have also identified several dimensions that seek to
measure individual privacy empowerment and further
evaluated the impact it has on other privacy constructs
like trust and privacy concern [1]. To comprehend and
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Table 1- Definitions of Terms
Terms and Dimensions

Definition

Third-option design

a sign-up template where users are provided with a partial consent option regarding the sale of the personal data to
third parties

Information sensitivity

the level of privacy concern an individual show when asked to disclose information in a specific situation

Reward/utility-limit
mechanism

for full consent- the reward mechanism promises participants a one-time $20 gift card while the utility-limit
mechanism only grants them full access to the online service
for partial consent (declining the collection and use of secondary data)- the reward mechanism provides full access
to the service but no gift card while the utility-limit mechanism provides access to a limited functional version of
the online service

Privacy Empowerment

providing consumers with the privacy control options and rights to control the nature and content of data collected
about them

Informativity

the provision of transparent notices to consumers regarding the type of data being collected, reasons for the data
collection and, how the data is being collected.

Optionality

the provision of privacy options and tools to individuals to manage the use, access and distribution of their
personal information

Controllability

the extent to which individuals are satisfied with the consequences of their privacy decisions

advocate for individual privacy empowerment, we
argue the need for continuous in-depth experimental
studies to analyze the trade-offs between information
disclosure, compensation and data control. Adopting
previously defined dimensions, we intend to measure
individual privacy empowerment in a 2*2
experimental design study (reward/utility-limit
mechanism to high/low sensitivity information
context) using a third-option online sign-up design.
The use of the reward and utility-limit mechanism is
based on previous studies which have found
compensation rewards as a primary influencer of
information disclosure[3-4].
The purpose of this study is to determine the
impact of rewards and utility-limit on individual
privacy empowerment in an information sensitivity
context when signing up for an online service. In the
next section, we discuss the underpinning theories of
this study, proceeded by the conceptual framework
and research design. The other half of the paper is
devoted to the discussion of results and contribution of
the study to both literature and practice.

2. Information Sensitivity and Disclosure
Information sensitivity is the level of privacy
concern an individual show when asked to disclose

information in a specific situation [5]. Request for
highly sensitive information has been found to be
positively correlated with privacy concern. This is
because people perceive disclosure of sensitive
information to be riskier than non-sensitive
information [6]. Several psychological theories have
been adapted to explain how individual behavior
influences information disclosure. One of such
theories is the theory of procedural justice which
posits that individuals are more likely to disclose
personal data for organizational use when they
perceive that fair procedures have been implemented
to protect their individual privacy. Also, the social
response theory asserts that an individual will
voluntarily disclose their personal information in
response to a similar disclosure from another
individual or organization. The theory further
describes the need for companies to build reciprocal
relationships with their customers to enhance
voluntary information disclosure. Li suggests that
companies can start with the exchange of less sensitive
data and subsequently, increase the level of sensitivity
depending on the intimacy of the relationship [7]. The
reciprocity theory, much similar to the social response
theory, also explains “the willingness of individuals to
match the level of intimacy in the disclosure they
return with the level of intimacy in the disclosure they
receive”[8]. Individuals often desire to exhibit fairness
in their transactions with third-parties but also will not
hesitate to retaliate or reward third-party behavior
when considered appropriate [9]. For instance,
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interviewers are likely to receive more responses from
3. Privacy Empowerment
surveys with attached monetary rewards than from
surveys with no attached monetary rewards. Also,
To empower is to grant an individual the power,
websites that request for registration (demographic
right or authority to perform various acts or duties
data) even before providing any service are less likely
[15]. The central theme of empowerment is the
to receive much data and even if they do, may receive
delegation of control. Alshibly and Chiong asserts that
falsified and inaccurate data.
empowerment is related to control while Hoffman et
The privacy calculus theory asserts that an
al. defines consumer empowerment as “shifting the
individual’s intention to disclose personal information
balance of power from service providers, who have
is dependent on some form of risk-benefit analysis.
traditionally held power, to the consumers who have
According to the risk-benefit or utility theory,
traditionally been powerless” [16, 17]. Consumer
information disclosure is primarily influenced by
empowerment is attained by providing customers the
monetary reward [10]. Culnan and Armstrong found
privacy control options and rights to control the nature
that individuals expect economic value or benefits at
and content of data collected about them. Van Dyke et
the expense of surrendering control of their personal
al. identified three dimensions: notice, choice and
data [11]. Further, recent studies show that users are
access which sought to measure individual privacy
often willing to trade off their privacy for both
empowerment in an e-commerce context [1].
financial and non-financial rewards [12,4,6].
Figure 1. The third-option design

Empirical evidence from these studies reveal that
consumers are more likely to accept cash
considerations or free complete software package
benefits in exchange for their information.
Interestingly, a couple of researchers and policy
analysts have raised issues that involve treating
consumer data as labor worthy of compensation [13].
The debate seems to have shifted from privacy
awareness to user compensation for data. Research
shows that online consumers have been denied the
opportunity to share in the wealth created by their
personal data which is valued around 156 billion
dollars annually [14]. To achieve individual privacy
empowerment, we argue the need for continuous indepth experimental studies to analyze the trade-offs
between information disclosure, compensation and
data control.

Frimpong and Sun further incorporated privacy design
principles and redefined these dimensions (notice as
informativity, choice as optionality and access as
controllability) to measure individual privacy
empowerment in an information sensitivity context
[2].
Hoepman argues that “the natural starting point to
derive privacy preserving strategies is to look at when
and how privacy is violated, and then consider how
these violations can be prevented” [18]. Research
shows that privacy violations often occur during
software installation processes and online service
sign-ups [19-21]. In line with Hoepman’s argument
and previous literature, we illustrate (using a sign-up
template in figure 1) how privacy design tools and
behavioral theories can be adopted and implemented
to empower individuals against online privacy
violations. The rationale behind the use of an online
sign-up template is to demonstrate how individuals
can be empowered to act autonomously and control

Page 4625

the use and sharing of their data in a single consent
decision. In the proceeding section, we illustrate the
proposed sign-up process (third-option design) of an
online service under the framework of privacy
empowerment dimensions: informativity, optionality
and controllability.

As such we hypothesize that the use of a
simplified privacy notice in the third-option design has
a significant effect on informativity.

3.1 Informativity

3.2 Optionality

Companies spell out the kind of information they
are going to collect from users in privacy notices and
end-user license agreements (EULA’s). These privacy
notices and EULA’s outline the contractual
obligations and rights between the service provider
and individual user. However, multiple surveys and
research reveal that most people have limited
understanding of privacy notices and even if they do,
possess little to no desire to read such lengthy notices
[19-21]. Research shows that these notices are written
“by lawyers for lawyers” due to the complexity of the
legal jargons and length of clauses which severely
limit user’s ability to understand and make informed
decisions [19-21]. For instance, a software provider
included a $1,000 cash prize offer in the company’s
privacy statement which was displayed during the
installation process. Interestingly, the prize was only
claimed after the software had been installed over
3,000 times in 4 months [22]. This provides evidence
that most people simply ignore these privacy notices
and as such have no idea what they consent to when
they choose to use the provided service. Privacy
notices therefore becomes a conduit for online
companies and service providers to violate individual
privacy rights.
Informativity is the most essential principle and
first step in the process of empowering users to take
control of their data management. This dimension
provides guidelines to ensure transparency in the datacollection process. It states that companies need to
ensure that their privacy documents are worded with
everyday simple language and provides answers to
questions like how, why and what information are
expected to be collected from individuals. Companies
need to ensure they adopt interactive privacy designs
that make it easier for individuals to read and
understand privacy notices in a shorter time frame.
These should enable users make rational privacy
decisions that reflect their level of privacy sensitivity
and concern. This presents a win-win situation for both
firms and most particularly, consumers since privacy
policies are clearly communicated and as such are able
to make properly informed decisions. Users can then
make informed decisions whether to sign-up for or
decline the use of online services.

Easy interpretation and comprehension of privacy
notices do not necessarily lead to informed decisions
if users are being limited to two forced options in
existing mandated disclosure forms. In a sense, this
design flaw negates all the advancements that have
been made to try and make it easier for users to read
and understand such complex privacy notices.
Individuals are expected to make informed decisions
as to which software packages and online services to
use based on their privacy concerns [23]. However,
current EULA and privacy notices employ a forced
consent design where individuals are provided with
only two options when signing up for an online service
or downloading a software package. The mandatory
disclosure design presents the user with “Yes, I agree”
and “No, I do not agree” options and as such do not
offer any motivation for users to read or pay attention
to the EULA and privacy notices [19]. Even when
motivated, privacy conscious users who are most
likely to pay attention or read such notices are unable
to do so. According to the privacy calculus theory,
individuals often compare the utility benefits of the
online service to the possible negative consequences
of signing up for online services. Therefore, they are
most likely to sign up for such services if the positives
outweigh the negatives, a situation which most often
is the case. In the situation where users might not agree
with the privacy notice or remain uncomfortable with
the monitoring and data collection practices of the
company, the only option available to such users is to
decline the terms of the privacy notices which means
they cannot use said software or online service.
After informativity, there is the need to provide
users the options and means to control the use of their
personal information after they have been informed of
the data collection activity. In this instance, the
optionality dimension posits that individuals should be
able to control the collection and use of secondary data
(data not required for the primary function of the
service but more so for marketing and third-party
sharing purposes). We argue that sign-up templates
ought to be designed to allow users decide the type and
sensitivity level of data they are willing to share. For
instance, companies can then classify their data
collection into two types: primary data (for registration

Hypothesis 1: The third-option design has a significant
effect on informativity.
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purposes and service functionality) and secondary data
which is mostly for marketing and third-party sharing
purposes. Users can then partially consent to either one
or both of the requested data types depending on their
privacy sensitivity level and still have access to the
service. This represents a shift from ‘the one size fits
all’ privacy approach where users have to consent to
the entire privacy notice to have access to the service.
Therefore, we postulate that the provision of a partial
consent (a granular form of privacy consent) in the
third-option design has a significant effect on
optionality.

mechanism when asked to disclose less sensitive
information. Also, the second principle asserts that
individuals will prefer a utility-limit mechanism when
asked to disclose highly sensitive information. We
elaborate more on both mechanisms in the next
section. Overall, we argue that the proposed design
mechanism should have significant impact on
controllability together with informativity and
optionality.

Hypothesis 2: The third-option design has a significant
effect on optionality.

4. Methodology

3.3 Controllability
Research findings also reveal that users are likely
to trade off their information privacy for monetary
rewards or full product features [12,4,6]. Therefore,
users who clearly agree that their information should
be collected and shared should receive some form of
compensation or perhaps a share of the economic
value generated from their data [9]. Arguments have
been advanced that such compensation framework
ought to be designed and introduced in privacy notices
[13]. As previously stated, current privacy notices are
regulated by the mandated disclosure law which offers
only two options and as such users can only decline or
agree to privacy notices. This forced consent design
do not offer any motivation for users to read or pay
attention to the EULA and privacy notices since there
is no real incentive in doing so [24]. To achieve
individual privacy empowerment, there is the need to
design a new sign-up template that introduces “a tradeoff option” in the sign up process providing users the
option to decide if they want companies to collect
secondary information and if so, their deserving
compensation. We argue that this mechanism should
not be an afterthought but rather a default privacy
principle embedded in the sign-up process.
The controllability dimension describes the extent
to which individuals feel satisfied with the outcomes
of their privacy decisions. People are well positioned
to make informed choices when they are properly
informed and provided with suitable privacy control
tools, and as such more likely to be satisfied with the
outcome of their choices. Companies need to adopt
privacy designs that ensure high informativity and
optionality to provide consumers the sense of control
they desire to feel empowered. The third-option design
is guided by two design principles based on the theory
of reciprocity and rational choice. The first principle
assumes that individuals will prefer a reward

Hypothesis 3: The third-option design have a
significant effect on controllability.

4.1 Research Design
An experimental survey was conducted to measure
privacy empowerment using a 2x2 factorial design
where two levels of information sensitivity were
paired with a reward and utility-limit mechanism. To
ensure novelty and practicality, respondents were
provided the context of signing-up for a hypothetical
online dating service (LetsHang.com). A survey tool
was designed to imitate the sign-up template described
in the previous section. Four different versions of the
tool were developed to reflect the 4 dimensions in
Figure 2 below.

Survey tool 1 and 2 both included low sensitive
information, however, both tools were assigned
different mechanisms (reward or utility-limit). The
same procedure was repeated for survey tool 3 and 4
using highly sensitive information. The reward
mechanism promised participants a one-time $20 gift
card for full consent while the utility-limit mechanism
only granted them full access to the online service. For
partial consent (declining the collection and use of
secondary data), the reward mechanism provided full
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access to the service but no gift card while the utilitylimit mechanism provided access to a limited
functional version of the online service. An initial
pilot study was conducted among a section of graduate
students to check for measurement errors. After which,
corrected versions of the survey tools were made
available online to the respondents.
The sample was divided into two groups: high and
low sensitivity context. To achieve our research
objectives, a within-subject experimental design was
used to measure perceived privacy empowerment
under two treatment mechanisms: reward and utilitylimit. Respondents in both groups (high and low
sensitivity) were exposed to the two treatment
mechanisms (reward and utility-limit). The withinsubject design is appropriate for relatively small
sample sizes and also ensures that, individual
differences do not distort the results since each
respondent serve as his/her own baseline.

4.2 Sample and Measures
This study adopted a quantitative online surveybased approach with a sample of 73 respondents.
Survey respondents were randomly sampled from the
student population at a large university in Texas. There
were 146 usable responses (due to the within-subject
experimental design) and no reported missing data in
the dataset. The sample comprised 34 males (46%) and
39 females (54%). More than half of the respondents
(63%) were found to be between ages 18 to 24 while
17% fell between ages 25 to 29. The measurement
scale for the three dimensions in the privacy
empowerment construct was developed based on an
extensive literature review [1,2,25]. Each of the three
dimensions
(informativity,
optionality
and
controllability) contained three items each. All items
were assessed using a 7-point Likert scale ranging
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ with the
exception of demographic questions (age, gender).

5. Results
The model was estimated using Smart PLS
statistical software due to the presence of both
reflective and formative scales. We assessed the
reliability and validity of the construct measures to
ensure that the constructs were accurately measured
and represented.

Figure 3. Estimated Model

Table 2. PLS Reliability and Validity Statistics
Statistic
Cronbach
’s Alpha
Composit
e
Reliabilit
y
Average
Variance
Extracted
HTMT
VIF’s

Desig
n
1.000

Optionali
ty
0.929

Controllabili
ty
0.931

1.000

0.955

0.956

1.000

0.875

0.879

0.145
3.298
3.866
4.139

3.744
4.283
3.552

1.000

Informativi
ty

1.994
1.882
1.582

0.127

Table 3. PLS Model Fit
Estimated Model

SRMR

Saturated
Model
0.029

d_ULS

0.047

0.047

d_G

0.110

0.110

Chi-Square

93.778

93.778

rms Theta

0.233

NFI

0.930

0.029

0.930

The figures shown in Tables 2,3 and 4 are estimated
using the Smart PLS software. As the estimated model
in Figure 3 shows, the factor loadings of reflective
constructs (i.e., Optionality and Controllability) were
pretty high (above 0.9), supporting reliability and
convergent validity. Meanwhile, the formative
construct of Informativity comprised three
components that exhibited different weights. In
addition, we checked for the model’s predictive
accuracy by assessing the coefficient of determination.
The R2 for the two endogenous constructs, optionality
(0.763) and controllability (0.813), signaled that the
model explained the majority of their variance. in
particular, over 80% of the variance in controllability
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was explained. All the fit indexes were satisfactorily
within the accepted thresholds (Appendix -table 3).
With the confidence in the model, we conducted a
multigroup analysis to determine the effect of the
mechanisms (rewards and utility-limit) on individual
privacy empowerment among the two groups (high
and low sensitivity). From Table 4, we found that the
design has a significant effect on informativity in both
groups indicating support for hypothesis 1. For
hypothesis 2, the design has a significant effect on
optionality in the low sensitivity group but not in the
high sensitivity group. This implies that hypothesis 2
is confirmed in the low sensitivity group but not in the
high sensitivity group. Further, we found that
hypothesis 3 was only supported in the high sensitivity
group.
Table 4. Multi-group Analysis

Design
->
Informativity
Design
->
Optionality
Design
->
Controllability

Low
Sensitivity
Group
Path
pCoefficien value
t
0.586
0.000

High
Sensitivity
Group
Path
pCoefficien
value
t
-0.712
0.000

0.156

0.020

-0.094

0.115

0.072

0.202

-0.124

0.032

Also, the results in Table 4 provide support for the
previously discussed design principles. The
multigroup analysis indicates that the low sensitivity
group preferred the reward mechanism to feel
empowered. The high sensitivity group rather
preferred the utility-limit mechanism to feel
empowered. For the low sensitivity group, the thirdoption design has significant effect on both
informativity and optionality but not controllability.
This means that participants in the low sensitivity
group depend on optionality to act as a full mediator
to feel empowered. However, this is not the case in the
high sensitivity group as optionality is not significant
as a mediator.

6. Discussions
When requesting information from individuals,
companies can enhance privacy empowerment by
providing adequate notice of data collection and
suitable privacy control options. Van Dyke et al.
asserts “that the provision of adequate notice is
empowering because it allows individuals to protect
their own interests and make decisions based on
informed consent” [1]. We found the use of a
simplified privacy notice in the third-option design to

be adequate enough to satisfy informativity so far as
individuals were informed of the type of data to be
collected, the data collection methods and the reasons
for the data-collection. Moreover, simplifying the
notice in the design made it easier for respondents to
understand and process, thereby ensuring that
subsequent individual disclosure decisions were based
on a genuine informed consent. Further, the design had
a significant effect on optionality indicating that
respondents preferred the additional “third choice
option”. Previous literature posits that perceived
empowerment can be achieved through the flexibility
in defining one’s data control choices and as such
individuals ought to be provided with data control
choices reflecting both primary use (needed to provide
the service) and secondary uses such as marketing and
third-party disclosure [1,25]. The third option design
increases individuals’ flexibility since it allows them
to control the primary and secondary use of their
personal data in a single consent decision. The partial
consent in the design allows individuals to consent to
the primary use of their data for service
personalization while forbidding any further
secondary use which is in stark contrast to the existing
mandated disclosure design. The design also has
significant effect on controllability and accounts for
81% of the variation in controllability. Therefore, the
respondents perceive that the design include fair and
transparent procedures to protect their privacy. Other
than justifying the procedural justice theory, the result
also implies that respondents were strongly satisfied
with their individual disclosure decisions. Previous
research indicates that consumers attain privacy
empowerment when they are satisfied with the
outcomes resulting from their privacy decisions [2].
Results from the multigroup analysis indicates
that respondents prefer the reward mechanism over the
utility-limit mechanism when asked to disclose less
sensitive data. Individuals expect reciprocity in their
relationship with companies and as such conduct a
cost-benefit analysis to determine the fairness of any
exchange they partake. In this instance, the
respondents perceive the low sensitive data to be less
risky and as such consider the $20 gift card to be a fair
return for any potential disclosure cost. Therefore, we
interpret that individuals are more likely to be satisfied
with the outcome of their privacy decisions when
companies attach monetary rewards when requesting
low sensitive data.
However, the utility-limit mechanism is preferred
in the highly sensitive group indicating that a simple
linear relationship does not exist between monetary
rewards and information sensitivity. In this instance,
respondents perceive the highly sensitive data to be
very risky and as such do not consider the $20 gift as
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a fair return in the exchange. However, they are rather
satisfied with the utility-limit mechanism which offers
full access to the dating service. Faja found that
individual privacy concern increases when consumers
are asked to disclose highly sensitive information for
financial rewards than for other benefits [26]. We offer
two possible explanations for this phenomenon.
Respondents might have subjectively valued the full
service access to be higher than the $20 gift card and
therefore perceive the offer as a fair return for any
potential disclosure risk. This rationale is supported by
Hwansoo et al. who asserts that “individuals perceive
monetary rewards as decoys and as such request for
sensitive data increases their uneasiness and raises
doubts about the motives behind monetary reward
offers” [12]. Also, due to the fair and transparent
procedures in the design, respondents might have felt
more comfortable and less concerned exchanging their
sensitive information for the service than the monetary
reward. This action confirms the reciprocity theory’s
assertion that individuals are likely to reciprocate
appropriate behavior (fair procedures in the design)
with a reward of their own. It should be noted that
individual disclosure preferences are not objective
measures of the attractiveness of both mechanisms but
rather, the relative contributions of the mechanism to
perceived privacy empowerment.
This study also offers practical suggestions to
companies regarding consumer empowerment. To
empower consumers, companies should treat
information disclosure as a “relationship” rather than
a transaction. Hwansoo et al., postulates that highly
sensitive information requests are often appropriate
for loyal users who have had multiple transactions
with the company signaling the existence of a “trusting
relationship” [12]. Also, companies seeking to
develop a trusting and transparent relationship with
their customers regarding information disclosure
should move away from mandated disclosure forms to
a more simplified form of privacy notices with flexible
options for privacy control. Previous research
indicates that monetary rewards are more appropriate
for low sensitive general information [12]. Therefore,
information-collecting companies should design their
reward mechanisms prudently as monetary rewards
exhibit a negative influence on information privacy
concerns specifically in a higher sensitivity context.

7. Conclusion
The growth of big data analytics has coincided
with the surge in data breaches and security threats.
Consequently, individual privacy concerns have
increased partly due to these security breaches and the
abuse of privacy rights by data-hungry organizations.

According to previous literature, privacy rights abuse
can be prevented through privacy empowerment and if
possible, eliminate all privacy concern issues. This
study proposes a third-option design that seeks to
empower users when signing up for an online service.
We have found that companies can empower their
consumers by adopting fair and transparent privacy
policies. Subsequently, consumer empowerment
should lead to a positive information disclosure
behavior. Also, companies should offer a blend of
monetary and non-monetary rewards in the
appropriate data sensitivity contexts. To sum it up,
privacy empowerment provides a possible win-win
solution for both companies and their respective
consumers and as such, companies are advised to
proactively adopt privacy policies that embody this
principle.
At this time, the respondents used for the study
were from the academic community at a large
university. This provides limitation on the extent to
which the results can be generalized to the general
population. However, plans are underway to conduct a
second data-collection activity to expand the sample
size and include working professionals in the study.
We anticipate this to increase the sample size, validity
and generalizability of the study. Also, this study
focused only on privacy empowerment and did not
consider its impact on other privacy constructs like the
privacy paradox, trust and privacy concern. Further,
future studies may consider possible legal policies and
regulations which can enhance the adaptability and
applicability of privacy control designs like the
proposed third-option design in the study.
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